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THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF DIGITAL LIBRARY COLLECTIONS
David R. Hansen*
This Article evaluates the scope of the public display right in the
context of digital library collections, and suggests an
interpretation of the right that tries to make sense of the practical
concerns that its drafters expressed when creating it. In short, the
Article focuses on the sometimes-forgotten but important fact that
the unauthorized display of copyrighted works is only an
infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right if the work is
displayed to "the public." The Copyright Act nowhere defines the
term "the public, " but viewed in light of its legislative history and
interpretive guidance from the courts, this Article argues that the
"public" part of "public display" can be read as meaning "the
public market for copies" of the work. When a display does not
impact the traditional public market for copies of the work-i.e.,
when one exploits copies at a level of use consistent with
traditional uses like library lending, for example-there is no
public display and therefore no infringement of the public display
right.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital copies of millions of copyrighted books lie virtually
untouched somewhere on Google's servers.' A related collection
of under-exploited content rests in the digital collection of the
HathiTrust.2 Similarly, vast stores of cultural and scientific
Digital Library Fellow, U.C. Berkeley School of Law.
See Joab Jackson, Google: 129 Million Different Books Have Been
Published, PCWORLD (Aug. 6, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article
/202803/google 129_million different books have beenpublished.html ("As
of June, the company has scanned 12 million books.").
2 See Statistics Information, HATHITRUST, http://www.hathitrust.org/statistics
info (last visited Dec. 5, 2011) (listing 9.8 million currently digitized volumes,
but only 2.6 million public domain works that are currently available for full
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content-both print and born digital materials-remain effectively
unread because readers cannot view them online, outside of the
libraries and archives that hold them. Many have asked why this
vast store of cultural material, which can be freely checked out in
physical formats from many libraries around the world, must
remain inaccessible in the digital form. This Article seeks to
address this digital access incongruity by explaining how copyright
law has facilitated limited library lending in the past and how it
may continue to do so in the future, at least where the application
of the public display right is at issue.
This Article argues that, so far as the public display right is
concerned, unauthorized but limited display of digital copies of
copyrighted works is not an infringement of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights because such a display is not to the "public."
Viewed in light of the legislative history and interpretive guidance
from the courts, this Article argues that the "public" part of "public
display" can be read as meaning "the public market for copies" of
the work. When a display does not impact the traditional market
for copies of the work-i.e., when one exploits copies at a level of
use consistent with traditional uses like library lending, for
example-there is no public display and therefore no infringement.
It is important to state from the beginning that this construction
of the public display right does not overcome all of the hurdles that
impede digital lending. While understanding the public display
right is important for addressing the access puzzle, it is only one
part. Other rights, such as reproduction and distribution, stand as
more immediate hurdles to full digital library access.
Nevertheless, public display remains as a right of importance to
future applications and one that, this Article argues, can be entirely
consistent with pre-digital uses.
Why are so many collections of works largely unavailable for
online viewing? The short answer is that many of these works are
not available online because their owners, when they can be
viewing). Both the Google and HathiTrust collections grant limited access for
uses such as text-mining, search, and snippet views. Id.
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found,' have not authorized online viewing, and because those who
wish to make them available (namely, digital libraries) feel that
they are not permitted to do so because copyright law restricts such
unauthorized access.4 But the law does not grant blanket control to
3 Many works in these collections are thought to be "orphan works" (i.e.,
works whose owners cannot be located), which are problematic because even if
users seek permission from owners, none can be obtained. Maria A. Pallante,
Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: Obstacles and Opportunities, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2012); see JOHN P. WILKIN, COUNCIL ON
LIBRARY AND INFO. RES., BIBLIOGRAPHIC INDETERMINACY AND THE SCALE OF
PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF "RIGHTS" IN DIGITAL COLLECTION BUILDING
(2011), available at http://www.clir.org/pubs/ruminations/01wilkin/wilkin.html
/wilkin.pdf (estimating that up to fifty percent of the in-copyright holdings of the
HathiTrust should be considered orphan works); see generally DAVID R.
HANSEN, BERKLEY DIGITAL LIBRARY COPYRIGHT PROJECT, WHITE PAPERNo. 2,
ORPHAN WORKS: MAPPING THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION SPACES (2012), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-2019121 (reviewing the most recent proposals to
address the orphan works problem).
4 This rather blunt formulation of the problem has a reciprocally (and
dangerously) blunt solution: Simply convert unauthorized access into
authorized access. This happens regularly; users (and the libraries and archives
that act on their behalf) seek out and pay for licenses that permit online use. For
large scale access, research libraries do so by expending massive amounts on
"big deal" licensing packages. But even on a large scale, licensing for digital
access is not a complete solution because it ignores the situation where licensors
cannot be found, are difficult to negotiate with, or may not understand or even
respond to the request for use. This problem is broadly considered to cover so-
called "orphan works" whose owners cannot be located, but also other works
that are similarly difficult to license. See generally DAVID R. HANSEN,
BERKLEY DIGITAL LIBRARY COPYRIGHT PROJECT, WHITE PAPER No. 1, ORPHAN
WORKS: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES (2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--197
4614.
Furthermore, while publishers of the core collection of library holdings are
sometimes willing and able to license access to their works, libraries and
archives collect and preserve many unique-and for preservation purposes,
arguably more important-sets of materials whose copyrights are held by less
sophisticated parties. Finally, by licensing, libraries also abdicate a central part
of their charge-to curate and preserve the cultural and scientific record. When
a library licenses for mere access (but not ownership) of a work, the burden of
preservation shifts from the holding library to commercial publishers whose
incentive to preserve may only last as long as the work retains commercial
viability. Without owning a copy of the work at issue, a library or archive
cannot ensure complete preservation of that item for the future.
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copyright owners. This has long been a feature of the Copyright
Act's structure of rights and limitations:
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all
uses of his copyrighted work. Instead . . . the Act enumerates several
"rights" that are made "exclusive" to the holder of the copyright. If a
person, without authorization from the copyright holder, puts a
copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these "exclusive
rights," he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to a use not
enumerated ... he does not infringe.5
While it is true that the exclusive rights are broad, they are not
boundless. So, the more complete answer is that access to these
works should be restricted only if access runs afoul of one of the
six exclusive rights circumscribed in section 106 of the 1976
Copyright Act 6 ("Copyright Act" or "Act") or the use does not fall
within one of the several limitations on those rights as codified in
sections 107-122 of the Act.'
This is a basic point, but one worth making when considering
the ways in which digital collections of copyrighted works might
be made viewable online. It is through these specific exclusive
rights and the yet more specific limitations on those rights that
Congress created a "balance between the artist's right to control
the work during the term of the copyright protection and the
public's need for access to creative works."' The specific rights
and limitations underlying this balance also enable the core
economic fiction that copyright relies upon: the making of
inherently non-rivalrous intellectual goods into rivalrous ones
through the grant of a "limited monopoly"' so that authors may
obtain a return on their creative investment in the marketplace.'o
5 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-95
(1968); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 447 (1984) ("Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not
necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an
infringement unless it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights
conferred by the copyright statute.").
6 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
7 Id. §§ 107-122.
8 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
9 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429; see also James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
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It is also through these specific rights and exceptions that
digital collections have, in some ways, been left out in the cold. In
the digital context, a familiar set of exclusive rights has continued
to meet the interests of rightsholders by maintaining the exclusivity
of their works." But limitations on those exclusive rights-
statutory exceptions worded to protect specific and narrow uses-
are often unable to provide balance in the face of technological
change. 2 It is true enough that those exceptions may, under the
correct circumstances, enable some access to digital collections,
and the breadth of those exceptions should be fully explored.
But access that is reliant on exceptions alone comes at a cost.
Practically speaking, digital access that is reliant on exceptions to
the exclusive rights is costly because exceptions are raised as
PROBS. 33, 42 (2003) (describing the perceived necessity of more refined legal
rules to deal with the increasingly non-rivalrous nature of intellectual goods in
an age where copying is almost completely costless). The "public good"
rationale for the limited monopoly is a basic theory underlying intellectual
property rights in general. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003);
David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 96, 97-100 (2010) (reviewing the idea of intellectual output as a "public
good").
'o In many cases, the return may not be directly to authors but to secondary
content owners (e.g., publishers). This is so despite, in the words of former
Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, the modem Copyright Act's "break with
the two-hundred-year-old tradition that has identified copyright more closely
with the publisher than with the author." Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights, U.S. Office of Copyrights, to James McGovern, Congressman
(Feb. 14, 2011), reprinted in 147 CONG. REC. E182 (2001) (quoting Barbara
Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
477, 490 (1977)).
" Most notably, the rights of reproduction and distribution. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1)-(3).
12 Kristen M. Cichocki, Unlocking the Future of Public Libraries: Digital
Licensing That Preserves Access, 16 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 32 (2008).
("Copyright law has always sought to strike a balance between protecting the
interests of authors and providing access to these works by the public. To this
goal, our copyright laws have accorded to public libraries certain exemptions to
the exclusive rights provided to copyright owners in section 106 of the
Copyright Act." (footnote omitted)).
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affirmative defenses; in the event of actual litigation, this
necessitates more probing and costly legal proceedings to prove
their application. These exceptions are also specific to certain
rights; requiring these exceptions to distort themselves to meet
challenges they were never meant to address may also be costly in
terms of unintended and inconsistent application with respect to
their specific purposes. 14  More importantly though, continued
reliance on exceptions alone runs the risk of leaving behind an idea
embedded in the structure of the Copyright Act, that the exclusive
rights carefully demarcated in section 106 grant owners broad, but
not boundless, control over copyrighted works.
Thus, this Article examines the breadth of one particular
exclusive right-public display-and how it applies in the context
of digital collections of copyrighted works. The Article does so
with specific regard to the vast stores of cultural and scientific
materials in our nation's libraries, archives, and museums. Though
public display is probably one of the least understood of the six
exclusive rights," its importance for digital collections is thus far
13 See generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 436-37 (7th ed. 2006)
(reviewing the structure of the Act and the general orientation of the limitations
as affirmative defenses raised in response to a claim of infringement).
14 The obvious exception to this very general statement is fair use, which is
described as an " 'equitable rule of reason,' which 'permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.' " Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 236 (1990) (citations omitted). Fair use, however, has come to be more
defined and itself has logical limits. See generally Jason Schultz & Aaron
Perzanowski, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MINN.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (describing the challenges of using the fair use
exception to justify a wide variety of personal uses because of, for example,
judicially developed limitations on the right beyond applications that are easily
identified as "transformative"); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Use, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) (describing specific "policy-relevant clusters" to
which fair use can be seen consistently applied).
15 See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright
Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM "Copies ", 2001 U. ILL.
L. REv. 83, 102-03 (2001). As explained below, infra Part III, since the
inception of the public display right in the 1976 Act, it has been seldom
interpreted by the courts.
150 [VOL. 14: 145
Public Display
understated. The right was only first created in the 1976 Copyright
Act, and although its application to the digital environment was
envisioned even at the time of enactment, it has remained seldom
relied upon alone because other rights-in particular, reproduction
and distribution-have accomplished much of what it was
designed to do. When public display is raised in litigation, it is
often in the context of other rights and the markets that those rights
have created. This is consistent with the purpose for which the
public display right was created, and represents an interpretive
stance that might inform unresolved questions about how public
display applies in the digital realm.
Part II provides a brief introduction to the public display right
and its history. Part III of this Article reviews how the public
display right interacts with the other exclusive rights and how,
when asserted, it is often done so in conjunction with other rights.
Part IV outlines an interpretation of "public display" that focuses
on the public market for copies of the work, an approach that
would allow digital copies of works to be treated similarly to
physical copies. Finally, Part V outlines what this interpretation of
the public display right means for digital lending of library and
archive collections.
II. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC DISPLAY
Before exploring the ways that public display has been used
and how it should be interpreted, it is important to understand
exactly how the statute defines the public display right and why it
was created. Given that the right is so seldom discussed in the
literature or in case law, this Part reviews in some detail the
statutory structure of the right and the legislative history related to
its creation.
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A. Statutory Text
Public display is among the six exclusive rights that section
106 grants copyright owners. 16  It provides that the copyright
control extends "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly."" "Display" is defined as "to show a copy of [a work],
either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any
other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.""
The elements of display-"to show" and "a copy"-are so basic
and inclusive that many copyrighted works are always the subject
of a display-a library book carousel or a picture hanging on the
wall are good examples-and "to show a copy" could cover
virtually any situation where a creative work sees the light of day.
So, the right is qualified by the term "publicly.""
"To perform or display a work 'publicly' " is itself defined in
the Act to cover two situations:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 20
Clause (1) captures direct displays and clause (2) captures displays
through a transmission. Direct public displays are defined by the
location in which they are made; they can be either in a place
16 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). The other rights are reproduction, preparation of
derivative works, distribution, performance, and public performance of sound
recogdings by means of a digital audio transmission. Id. § 106(1)-(4), (6).
7 1d. § 106(5).
" Id. § 10 1.
9 Id.
20 Id. This definition of "publicly" is shared by both public performance and
public display. Id. How the two differ is discussed infra Part III.
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"open to the public" or in a semi-public place where a substantial
number of persons gather together. 2 1 The semi-public part of
clause (1) was apparently intended to expand the reach of the right
beyond places open to the public, to also include performance or
display in places "such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps,
and schools." 2 2 Direct public displays are so familiar that they
almost go unnoticed: Billboards, books on the shelf of a
bookstore, or posters hanging on the wall of a restaurant are all
valid examples.
Because of fears that the public display right would reach so
broadly as to capture many accepted, everyday exhibitions of
copyrighted works, Congress also created a specific "first sale"
exception for direct display of works lawfully made under the
Act.23 Section 109(c) provides that:
Notwithstanding the [public display] provisions of section 106(5), the
owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the
projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at
the place where the copy is located.24
Ultimately, the exception in section 109(c) undoes much of what
clause (1) in the definition above accomplishes. Section 109(c)
excludes essentially all non-transmitted public displays except for
21 id.
22 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976). This phraseology was intended to
counteract the decisions in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distribution Corp. v. Wyatt,
21 C.O. Bull. 203 (D. Md. 1932), which held performances in these semi-public
places to be outside the scope of the performance right under the prior Copyright
Act. Id.
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 109. Other specific exceptions to the public display right
(and public performance) are found in section 110 of the Act. See id. § 110.
24 Id. § 109(c). "The concept .of 'the place where the copy is located' is
generally intended to refer to refer to a situation in which the viewers are present
in the same physical surroundings as the copy, even though they cannot see the
copy directly." H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 80. Also note that despite this limitation,
"[a]s in cases arising under section 109, this does not mean that contractual
restrictions on display between a buyer and seller would be unenforceable as a
matter of contract law." Id. at 79. Leaving open contractual restrictions raises
questions about the applicability of the exception to licensed library collections.
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displays of works not made lawfully under the Act,25 or projections
that are of more than one image at a time.26 Direct display of a
forged painting would violate the display right, as would multiple
simultaneous projections of a lawful copy to many people, even if
in one place.27 Outside of those situations, clause (1) is generally
left to cover only public performances, which are not subject to the
section 109(c) limitation.28
25 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). The meaning of the term "lawfully made under this
title" is not entirely clear in the context of § 109, particularly for what "under
this title" means. Id.; see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210,
222 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e hold that the phrase 'lawfully made under this Title'
in § 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in
territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured
works.").
For libraries and museums this undetermined meaning is troubling because it
could mean that many ordinary direct displays are not permissible if the work
was produced overseas. For example, a Picasso "manufactured" in France or
Spain may not be permitted to be publicly displayed, even directly, in the United
States under this reading of section 109's "lawfully made under this title"
clause. It is relatively clear, however, that if a work is made in direct violation
of a provision of the Act, it is not lawfully made. See e.g., Mass. Museum of
Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2010)
(holding that if display of work was in violation of moral rights granted under
the Visual Artists Rights Act-also part of Title 17, protecting artists' moral
interests in their works-the public display of that work would not be "lawful"
for purposes of section 109(c)).
26 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). The 1966 House Report explains (under the language
at the time):
[T]he exemption would extend only to public displays that are made 'either
directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time.' . . . For
example, where each person in a lecture hall has his own viewing apparatus
in front of him, the copyright owner's permission would generally be
required in order to project an image of a work on each individual screen at
the same time.
H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 68 (1966).
27 This distinction relates to the overall theme of the public display right as
supporting markets established by other rights. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.11.2 (3d ed. 2011) ("The single-image limitation
recognizes that to permit users to display more than one image of the same work
simultaneously could supplant the market for copies.").
28 Commentators have suggested that performances were not similarly
excepted in section 109(c) because there is a difference in the type of market for
154 [VOL. 14: 145
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For the purposes of displaying digital collections, the second
clause of the definition is most pertinent. It provides that public
display also means "to transmit or otherwise communicate" a
display to either a place specified in clause (1), or to the public,29
regardless of the place of reception. Clause (2) is expansive in that
it applies to displays to the public through any technological
means, regardless of whether individual members of the public are
capable of actually receiving the display in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.30 The
term "transmit" is likewise defined broadly in the statute with
respect to performance or display to mean "to communicate it by
any device or process whereby images or sounds are received
beyond the place from which they are sent."3 1 Although not
commonplace at the time of the Act's passage, public displays via
transmission are now fairly common. Think, for example, of the
electronic billboards in Times Square: Each displays a
transmission of an image of a work that is located somewhere else
(likely stored on a remote server) to a place open to the public.
The application of the public display right to copies of works
shown over digital networks is fairly obvious, and has already been
each; performance of works protected by the public performance right (e.g.,
movies or songs) have a significant in-person market, but public display of art
work, for example, is much less significant. See Reese, supra note 15, at 92.
Professor Goldstein has asserted that the same market distinction should matter
in the context of considering what is "public" for purposes of display or
performance. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 7.10. This distinction is
discussed in more detail infra Part IV.
2917 U.S.C. § 101.30 d. The 1976 House Report explains:
Under the bill, as under the present law, a performance made available by
transmission to the public at large is "public" even though the recipients are
not gathered in a single place, and even if there is no proof that any of the
potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the
transmission. The same principles apply whenever the potential recipients
of the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as the
occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable television service.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64-65 (1976).
3 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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tested in the online environment in a number of cases.32 Indeed, in
a thorough exposition of the public display right, Professor
Anthony Reese describes the creation of the right as "a remarkable
act of foresight" on the part of Congress and the Copyright Office
to anticipate digital networked communications that would enable
useful display of copyrighted works in ways that do not require
making a new copy." Examples are of the kind we are used to
seeing every day-for example, the showing of a copy of an image
on the open web to anyone who happens upon it would seem to be
uncontroversially labeled a transmission to the public, and has in
fact been held to be a public display (although ultimately fair use)
in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc.34 Closer to the library and
educational context, displaying online educational materials to
students in an open assembly might also qualify as display via
transmission to the public.
Considering the section 109(c) exception and the two-clause
definition of "publicly," one can piece together that public display
applies, in the context of a digital transmission, to a location where
many people are permitted to view the work-either a place open
to the public or a semi-public place where more than family or
friends can see the display"-or simply to "the public," which is
qualified to include displays even where members of the public can
receive the transmission at different places or different times.36 For
32 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the open and online display of copies of images held on
defendant's servers was prima facie infringement of plaintiffs public display
right, but that in-line "framing" of images hosted elsewhere was not a public
display); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp.2d
321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002), affd, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[P]roviding clip
previews online constitutes a 'public display' that violates the copyright owner's
exclusive right 'to display the copyrighted work publicly.' "); see also Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 336
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (initially holding that the linking and framing of
Kelly's photographs on Arriba Soft's website infringed Kelly's public display
right, but later vacating that holding because the issue was not raised below).
33 Reese, supra note 15, at 84.
34 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007).
" 17 U.S.C. § 101.
36 id.
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digital transmissions of library holdings (for example, the
transmission of an image of a page of a book to a user's laptop)
focusing on the location where the display is made would be
inapposite in most cases, since the location could be almost
anywhere, including the privacy of the user's own bedroom or in
the corner of a coffee shop. Without knowing the precise location,
the display must be examined as to whether it was made to the
public under the second part of clause (2). This is where the
difficulty arises. Many of the terms in clause (2)-including
"transmit" and "display"-are explicitly defined in the Act and
give some outline of the breadth of the right." Others (most
importantly, "the public") are not.
B. Legislative History
To begin to understand what the right of public display is
meant to address, it is instructive to look to the legislative history.
Reliance on legislative history always comes with caveats,
however." For the Copyright Act, the most recent revision process
was sixteen years long and spanned the tenure of three Registers of
Copyright, four Presidents, and scores of Representatives and
Senators.3 9 The revision process also included input from a unique
mix of industry and special interest groups.40 As a result, at least
one Supreme Court Justice has referred to this tangled history as
3 Id.
38 For a complete documentation of the revision process, see OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman, ed., 1981).
A concise overview of the lengthy revision process is available in Jessica
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275,
305-42 (1989); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). For an excellent and
detailed review of the legislative history of the public display right in particular,
see Reese, supra note 15, at 92-102. This Article benefits tremendously from
Professor Reese's work in collecting and discussing legislative history related to
the creation of the public display right.
39 See generally Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
supra note 38.
40 id
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"notoriously impenetrable."4 1 From the history standing alone, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about specific interpretations of the
public display right that finally emerged in the 1976 Act.42
Nevertheless, the rather complete documentation does lend some
hints about the general problem with which Congress and the
Copyright Office were concerned as they slowly developed the
right into its final form.
By the time Congress created the public display right in 1976,43
it had reviewed several possible variations of the right over the
nearly two-decade-long revision process. The first iteration
extended only to a copyright owner's right to exhibit pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, and that limited right was further
narrowed by a provision that specifically ended the right after a
first sale of the work.44 As Professor Reese explains, these
limitations meant that the owner of the copyright would effectively
41 Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd
sub nom. Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., Inc., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000), aff'd, 533
U.S. 483 (2001) (statement of then-Judge Sotomayor).
42 Indeed, the text of the public display right or related definitions changed
dozens of times over the revision process. One must be cautious when using
such scattered history for a particular interpretation. See Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845,
851-61 (1992) (describing the appropriate use of legislative history, in
conjunction with other tools in cases of, among others, specialized legislative
meaning, to identify a reasonable purpose, and choosing among reasonable
interpretations of a politically controversial statute). Justice Breyer goes on to
note that in cases of vague or conflicting history-which is often present in the
1976 Act documentation-one legitimate option remains: "[D]o not use it. No
one claims that legislative history is always useful; only that it sometimes
helps." Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
4 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
AND DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 6 (Comm. Print 1964)
[hereinafter 1964 PRELIMINARY DRAFT] ("Copyright in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works shall include the exclusive right to exhibit copies by
broadcasting or retransmission . . . . [T]his right shall end with respect to a
particular copy as soon as its first sale or other transfer of ownership has taken
place.").
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have received a right analogous to the common-law literary right
of first publication; as with that right, the public exhibition right
contemplated at this stage would have ceased upon the first lawful
transfer of the work.45
The several built-in limitations on the right-specifically, its
application to only visual materials and its effective termination
upon transfer of the work-were quickly loosened in subsequent
versions. The Copyright Office in its 1965 Supplementary Report
explained that though display of visual works was its initial
concern when it suggested the exhibition right, it recognized that
written works (such as "books, articles, the text of the dialogue and
stage directions of a play or pantomime") might also be widely
disseminated through public displays, and so require similar
protections.4 6
By the time of the 1965 revised version, which broadened the
scope beyond visual materials and provided that the right should
survive the first sale, public display was discussed primarily in
relation to the scope of protection under other rights and their
continued usefulness in maintaining the copyright owner's
monopoly privileges for the purpose of extracting economic value
from their works. Thus, the Copyright Office report explained
that:
[W]e have become increasingly aware of the enormous potential
importance of showing, rather than distributing, copies as a means of
disseminating an author's work.. . . Equally if not more significant for
the future are the implications of information storage and retrieval
devices; when linked together by communications satellites or other
means, these could eventually provide libraries and individuals
throughout the world with access to a single copy of a work by
transmission of electronic images. It is not inconceivable that, in
certain areas at least, "exhibition" may take over from "reproduction"
of "copies" as the means of presenting authors' works to the public.47
45 Reese, supra note 15, at 95.
46 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION
BILL at 20 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter 1965 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
47 id.
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Although the digital networked communications were not yet
widespread, there was significant fear that their development
would hinder existing markets for reproductions. The concern
about the impact of public displays on the continued scope of
protection provided by other rights is repeated throughout the
legislative history. The House Report for the final 1976 Act
explains a similar concern in the context of the section 109(c)
exception for non-transmitted public displays:48
The committee's intention is to preserve the traditional privilege of the
owner of a copy to display it directly, but to place reasonable
restrictions on the ability to display it indirectly in such a way that the
copyright owner's market for reproduction and distribution of copies
would be affected. . .. [P]rojection of more than one image at a time, or
transmission of an image to the public over television or other
communication channels, would be an infringement for the same
reasons that reproduction in copies would be.49
This concern went so far that book publishers, anxious about
diminishing markets for copies of their works, proposed what
amounted to a merger of the rights; the proposal suggested that, in
essence, where a display was made in lieu of a copy, the display
should be treated as a reproduction." The House Judiciary
Committee rejected the proposal, flatly stating that it wished to
maintain reproduction and public display as conceptually distinct
(though failing to explain why)." To address the concerns of the
publishers, however, the Committee further reduced the scope of
the then-proposed section 109 first-sale limitation, leaving out
simultaneous projections of the same image, even to viewers
located in the same place as the copy of the work.52 The example
used by the Committee to justify this limitation-preventing
48 Following the Register's 1965 Supplementary Report, the right was
changed from one of public exhibition to public display because of concern for
distinguishing "the well-established use of the word 'exhibit' in the motion
picture industry to refer to the performance of a motion picture," from the term
"exhibit" as used in the draft revision bills. H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 56
(1966); 1965 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 46, at 23.
49 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 80 (1976) (emphasis added).
SO H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 55.
' Id. at 56.
52 Id. at 56, 67-68.
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multiple, simultaneous displays of the same copy to individual
viewing devices in a lecture hall-seems clearly tied to the
reproduction market for textbooks." But whatever the precise
market in mind, the Committee again cited its desire to place
reasonable restrictions on display so that the copyright owner's
market for reproduction and distribution would not be affected.54
At the same time the report continued to emphasize that "[n]o
provision of the bill would make a purely private display of a work
a copyright infringement.""
In explaining particular applications of the right, the legislative
history also evidences these same concerns. Former Register
Abraham Kaminstein, for example, gives his thoughts on what the
right should cover in this 1965 Hearings testimony:
[D]isplay[ing] the work temporarily on a ... screen . . . would be an
infringement only if the image of the work is transmitted beyond the
location of the computer in which the copy is stored; I do not believe
that the transitory image of a copyrighted work, taken from an
authorized reproduction stored in a computer and consulted at the
computer site, should be treated as different from the consultation of a
book in a library.56
Although this is an early view of the right, Register Kaminstein
recognized that reproduction and transmitted displays are tied
together, while also acknowledging that the traditional limitations
on copyright owners' control-for example, allowing patrons to
view a book in the library-should at least be so acknowledged in
the digital realm."
" Id. at 68.
54 d
51d. at 56.
56 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on HR. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831,
and H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 3,
89th Cong. 1861 (1966) (statement of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of
Copyrights).
57 While Register Kaminstein seemingly takes a broad and location-centered
view of public display in the first part of his statement, it should be tempered by
the realization that this statement was made partly in the context of a discussion
about a potential limitation on the reproduction right to enable unauthorized
storage in a data processing machines; Register Kaminstein's position was that
such an exception was unnecessary and would hurt copyright owners' markets.
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In these and other instances, public display is cast in the
legislative history as a right needed to ensure the support of
markets established by other rights. Indeed, as discussed in the
next Part of this Article, public display is often relied upon for this
purpose, supporting markets created by reproduction, distribution,
or performance.
III. PUBLIC DISPLAY AND THE OTHER EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
Given the supporting role that public display was-at least in
part-created to play, it makes sense to consider how it has worked
in conjunction with other rights. The Part below outlines how
public display relates to the rights of public performance,
reproduction, and distribution. Because public display is so little
discussed in legal disputes or legal policy documents, the
conclusions below are necessarily inferred from an uncomfortably
thin record of case law, but are nonetheless instructive to illustrate
the supporting role that this right has thus far played.
A. Public Display and its Relation to Public Performance
One of the more confusing aspects of the public display right is
its relation to the right of public performance. The performance
right is codified in section 106(4); public display is in section
106(5). "Perform" is defined to mean "to recite, render, play,
dance, or act [a work], either directly or by means of any device or
process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible."5 ' Recall that display requires showing a
copy of a work, either directly or by means of a device such as on a
film, slide, or television image."
The two rights share some common elements. The most
notable is that both share a common definition of the term
"publicly," the details of which are discussed above. Public
Similarly, a broad exception for public display would also hurt those same
markets. Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
59id.
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performance and public display are also treated similarly in many
of the specific exceptions. Some of the specific exceptions
enumerated in section 110 of the Act (for nonprofit performances)
apply to public displays as well,60 as do a few other particular
exceptions and limitations.6' Indeed, in the revision process of the
section 110 exceptions, initiated in the late 1990's to expand
coverage for online educational purposes, the two were almost
always discussed as a group both by the Copyright Office 62 and in
committee reports from both houses of Congress.
The most obvious distinction between the two rights is
linguistic. One can hardly perform a picture, nor does one
ordinarily display a song.' This is borne out in types of works
covered by each right. The right to public performance covers
"literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,"6
and in a more limited way, to sound recordings performed "by
means of a digital audio transmission."66 Public display applies to
those same works (except sound recordings), but also reaches to
"pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work."67
60 See id. § 110(1)-(3), (5) (enumerating exceptions for face-to-face teaching,
educational transmission, religious services, and performance or display on a
device ordinarily used in private homes).
61 See id. § 111(c) (addressing cable transmissions); id. § 112 (addressing
ephemeral recordings); id § 118 (addressing noncommercial broadcasting); id
§ 119(a) (addressing satellite transmissions); id § 122 (addressing local
retransmissions).
62 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATIONpassim (1999), available at http://copyright.gov/reports/de rprt.pdf.
63 See id.; S. REP. No. 107-31, at 8-11 (2001); H.R. REP. No. 107-687 passim
(2002).
6 See, e.g., 1965 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 46, at 21 ("[T]he bill
regards the showing of motion pictures as a 'performance' rather than an
'exhibition,' and an exhibition right would, of course, be inapposite with respect
to sound recordings which are purely aural in nature.").
65 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
6 6 Id. § 106(6).
67 Id. § 106(5).
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Similarly, under the current Act, public performance does not
require a copy of the work in order to perform it; one need merely
"recite, render, play, dance, or act [the work], either directly" or
indirectly.68 Performance is not dependent on a copy of the work
because many performances can do without the material object of a
copy; an actor reciting memorized lines is an easy example. Public
display, however, is difficult to imagine without the showing of
some material object, either directly or indirectly through a
transmission. Thus, to display a work simply means to show a
copy of it in a variety of ways.69 While this requirement may exist
largely for practical reasons, it is also one that ties the public
display right to the right of reproduction (copies) in a way that
public performance is not.
The distinction, however, goes much deeper. To understand
what the public performance right is intended to protect requires an
examination of its creation. The right to "act, perform, or represent
the same" in a public place was first codified in 1856.0 This right
was primarily intended to benefit playwrights and the market for
in-person performance of their works." That right extended only
68 id.
69 Id
7o An Act Supplemental to an Act entitled "An Act to Amend the Several Acts
Respecting Copyright," Approved February Third, Eighteen Hundred and
Thirty-One, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (1856) (hereinafter Public Performance
Amendment of 1856); see also REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION, supra note 62, at 79, available at http://copyright.gov/reports/derp
rt.pdf. The 1856 Act granted to "the author or proprietor of any dramatic
composition, designed or suited for public representation" the "sole right ... to
act, perform, or represent the same ... on any stage or public place." Public
Performance Amendment of 1856, supra, at 139. The right was apparently the
culmination of over twenty years of lobbying to enact a "Dramatic Copyright" to
give American authors an incentive to capture some of the market that European
productions enjoyed. See Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act
Amendment 1856, PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), (L. Bently
& M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), available at http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/r
equest/showRecord?id=commentary us 1856.
n See Jessica Litman, The Invention of the Common Law Play Right, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1402-03 (2010) (reviewing the role of playwrights
in the enactment of the 1856 amendment).
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to dramatic works but covered all types of performances (both for-
profit and nonprofit).72 After lobbying on the part of composers,
dramatists, and even interested members of Congress themselves,
the right was then expanded in 1897 to also reach public
performances of musical compositions. 73 The 1909 Act further
tweaked the right: While the 1909 Act continued to provide broad
protection for dramatic works, it also provided that nonprofit
musical performances were not covered under the right.74
Similarly, nonprofit dramatico-musical compositions could be
performed by a variety of religious and charitable organizations
without prior authorization." These changes were apparently
uncontentious and were rarely raised in court.7 ' The right was
modified again in 1952 to reach for-profit performances of
nondramatic literary worksn a change motivated in part by new
technological abilities to perform these works in new forms (e.g., a
book on tape or a book on record),"7 as the drafters recognized that
72 Public Performance Amendment of 1856, supra note 70, at 139; see also
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1.2756 (Westlaw Supp. 2011). The
limitation to public performances of dramatic works survived the 1871 general
revision. See An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating
to Patents and Copyrights, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (providing authors
and inventors the "sole liberty" of "in the case of a dramatic composition . . .
publicly performing or representing it").
" An Act to Amend Title Sixty, Chapter Three, of the Revised Statutes,
Relating to Copyright, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481 (1897). The 1897 Act
distinguished between for-profit and nonprofit uses by providing greater
penalties in the case of for-profit infringements. Id. For a complete history of
the amendment, see Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A
Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public Performance for Musical
Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157 (2007).
74 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L.
No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
5 Id. at § 28.
76 PATRY, supra note 72, § 14.4.
n An Act to Amend Title 17 of the United States Code Entitled "Copyrights"
With Respect to Recording and Performing Rights in Literary Works, Pub. L.
No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752, 752 (1952).
78 Recording and Performing Rights in Certain Literary Works: Hearings on
H.R. 3589 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd
Cong. 6 (1951) (statement of John Schulman, Authors League of America, Inc.)
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"the hearing public as a market for literary work is becoming as
important as the reading public."79
Finally, in 1976 the right was extended to both dramatic and
non-dramatic works of the particular types listed in the statute.
The nonprofit restriction was removed from the definition of the
right itself, but parts of it were maintained in specific exceptions;"o
only certain nonprofit public performances (and public displays)
were outside the coverage of the right." Those include nonprofit
uses generally covered by section 110 of the Act, which allows for
(among other uses) face-to-face and certain online educational,
religious, and nonprofit performances of nondramatic works for no
commercial gain.82
("[T]he author, who is given exclusive, so far as putting out books is concerned,
finds himself entirely without protection if someone wants to take his novel and
put it on a record.").
7 H.R. REP. No. 82-1160, at 2 (1951).
80 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62-63 (1976) ("[The new statutory scheme] is
more reasonable than the outright exemption of the 1909 statute. The line
between commercial and 'nonprofit' organizations is increasingly difficult to
draw. Many 'nonprofit' organizations are highly subsidized and capable of
paying royalties, and the widespread public exploitation of copyrighted works
by public broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is likely to grow.
In addition to these trends, it is worth noting that performances and displays are
continuing to supplant markets for printed copies and that in the future a broad
'not for profit' exemption could not only hurt authors but could dry up their
incentive to write." (emphasis added)).
81 Id. at 62. This structure was thought about in the context of foreign
articulations of author rights and limitation. Id ("The approach of the bill, as in
many foreign laws, is first to state the public performance right in broad terms,
and then to provide specific exemptions for educational and other nonprofit
uses.")
82 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006). Section 110 carves out a number of oddly-specific
exceptions to the performance right (and in some cases, also display right),
which tend to allow unauthorized use in cases where the potential market gain is
relatively insignificant compared to the overall benefit afforded by unauthorized
use. These include "performance of a nondramatic musical work by a
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization";
performance of nondramatic musical works by government or nonprofit
organization in the context of an agricultural or horticultural fair; "performance
of a nondramatic musical work by a vending establishment open to the public at
large without any direct or indirect admission charge, where the sole purpose of
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Just a brief review of the origins of the public performance
right illustrates the variety of intended markets and authors that the
right seeks to protect. The right to public performance is a far
older right that protects a variety of interests, most of which are
centered on markets for works in forms that enable consumers to
consume the work in different and new formats (e.g., watching a
novel acted out as a movie or play, or listening to a book on tape).
This is distinct from public display, which, according to the
legislative history, is concerned with substitutions in media (e.g.,
from books to display of text on a screen), but not necessarily
substitutions in form. While public display is intertwined with
public performance in many ways, the two remain distinct rights
with distinct purposes. Similarly, public display has a
complicated, and in many cases, dependent relationship with other
of the exclusive rights.
B. Relationship with Other Rights
Traditionally, the exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution provided much of the protection that copyright owners
desired. In a world of physical copies, these rights restricted the
ability of a user to copy a book or to distribute those copies, and
around those exclusive rights numerous exceptions developed to
allow users some flexibility with physical copies. The doctrine of
first sale was developed as an exception to the distribution right,
allowing users to resell or lend out lawful copies of copyrighted
works." This exception is central to the practice of library lending
the performance is to promote the retail sale of copies"; "performance of a
nondramatic literary work, by or in the course of a transmission specifically
designed for and primarily directed to blind or ... handicapped"; performance
on a single occasion of ten-year or older dramatic literary work for the blind or
handicapped, performance of nondramatic literary or musical works by veterans
associations if proceeds go to charity; and "the making imperceptible, by or at
the direction of a member of a private household, of limited portions of audio or
video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that
household for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion
picture." Id. § 110(6)-(H1).
83 Id. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), [the
distribution right,] the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
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of print materials.84 Likewise, the exceptions found in section 108
of the Copyright Act provide that it is not an infringement of the
reproduction or distribution right for libraries to make copies of
works for certain preservation and library lending purposes."
These and other copyright exceptions have been updated to some
extent to cope with aspects of the digital world," but for the most
part they are still firmly grounded in a world where physical and
in-person use of works is the primary concern." Although digital
access could certainly be seen on the horizon, this is the world that
existed in 1976 when the Act was passed.
As the legislative history contemplated, the public display right
has mostly been used to support markets established by other
rights. Case law on public display illustrates just how bundled the
right has become: Of about forty post-1978 reported decisions
citing to section 106(5) (public display), only a handful discuss the
right without an intertwined alleged violation of either the
reproduction or distribution rights." In the early days of the web,
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
of that copy or phonorecord."). The doctrine was judicially recognized in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
84 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association, Association of
College and Research, & the Association of Research Libraries in Support of
Petitioner, Kirsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. 2012), 2012
WL 2641851 (explaining importance of first sale for library lending); Kevin L.
Smith, Eyes Wide Open?, LIBR. J. (Sept. 6, 2012), http://lj.librar
yjournal.com/2012/09/opinion/peer-to-peer-review/eyes-wide-open-peer-to-peer
-review/ (explaining the importance of the first-sale right to library lending and
the perverse outcomes that would result if the right were restricted in various
ways).
8 17 U.S.C. § 108.
For example, section 110 was updated to allow for educational
transmissions and section 117 was modified to allow copying of computer
programs for certain purposes. Id. §§ 110(2), 117.
" Id. §§ 107-120.
88 This is not necessarily the full corpus of public display decisions. Notable
cases where public display stands alone tend to be in the physical (not digital)
realm. See, e.g., Mass. Museum Of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel,
593 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying museum's motion for summary
judgment on grounds that public display of unfinished artwork might not fall
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public display was not tied to acts that necessarily implicated those
rights. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,89 for example, the
court approached public display as relatively distinct from
reproduction and distribution. In that case, Playboy Enterprises
brought a copyright infringement suit against George Frena,
operator of a bulletin board service ("BBS"), which hosted
unauthorized high-resolution copies of Playboy-owned
photographs that were made available for subscribers to browse,
view, and download."o Though Playboy also alleged infringement
of its distribution rights, the court discussed the online viewing of
the images primarily as a matter of public display." Harkening
back to cases dealing with in-person displays, the court focused on
the location and associational dimensions of the right that are
described in clause (1) of the definition of public display.92 The
court ultimately found that the BBS was open to the public, or that
it was at least available to a substantial number of persons outside
of a normal family or circle of friends, and, therefore, held that the
display was public for copyright purposes.9 3
The online independence of public display was quickly lost.
Only a few years later in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
within the section 109(c) exception for direct display because exhibition of art in
unfinished state without artists approval could violate the artists rights under the
Visual Artists Rights Act, thus making the copy "not lawfully made" under the
title); Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1140 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (denying preliminary injunction for infringement of display right of
copyrighted cartoon characters shown in sales sheets sent to retailers because the
display was not "public" and denying claim for display on display racks because
of lack of substantial similarity).
8 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
90 Id. at 1554.
9' Id. at 1557-59. The court did discuss downloadable copies as implicating
the distribution right, but in the context of the separate issue of copies of the
works that would ultimately reside on user's computer for more than just the
period of time required for the initial display. Id. at 1556.
92 Id. at 1557.
93 Id. (citing Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Products, 672 F. Supp. 237, 240
(W.D.N.C. 1987) (addressing display at a trade show); Ackee Music, Inc. v.
Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1986) (addressing performance of
copyrighted songs at private club)).
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On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,94 the shift was obvious."
Netcom, like Playboy, discussed the legitimacy of BBS storage and
access to copyrighted content. Rather than directly addressing
the public display right, however, the court in Netcom focused first
on the reproduction right, relying on MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.,9 (an intervening decision by the Ninth Circuit) for
the proposition that a temporary instantiation of a work stored in a
computer's temporary memory constituted a copy (i.e.,
reproduction) under the Copyright Act.98 The court ultimately held
that user-uploaded copies (stored on Netcom systems for eleven
days) were indeed reproductions, but that Netcom was not directly
liable for those reproductions because there was no causal or
volitional act on Netcom's part.99 The court went on to also hold
that Netcom was not directly liable for infringing the public
display right by mere possession of a copy of a work that is
accessible to the public, because of similar causation problems."oo
For public display purposes, the important point from Netcom
and similar cases is that the very same facts supporting the court's
finding for reproduction also support its finding regarding the
public display right. The two had become so fused together that
display in the online world almost necessarily means that the
reproduction right is infringed. In so doing, the precise scope of
the public display right-limited most obviously by its adjectival
modifier, "public"-becomes either irrelevant or presumed, as
reproduction has no such limitation.
94 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
" Id. at 1368.
96 id
9 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993).
98 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
99 Id. at 1371. Prior to the creation of the DMCA safeharbors for internet
service providers, this volitional test was a more important means of separating
internet service providers from the massive liability created by their users. See
Matthew D. Lawless, Comment, Against Search Engine Volition, 18 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 205, 213-26 (2008) (discussing the DMCA safeharbor, the
volitional test, and its more recent applications).
00 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
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The co-dependency of these two rights is only reinforced (and
further muddled) in later cases. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon. com,
Inc.,'O1 for example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the propriety of the
Google Image Search system. Perfect 10, owner of a website that
hosts pictures of nude models, sued claiming that the reproductions
and display of images in Google Images' search results constituted
copyright infringement.O2 The Google image search system
operates in two stages: First, to create its index of the images, the
system crawls individual websites collecting contextual
information about the site's images, and it then makes and stores
(on Google-controlled servers) low-resolution thumbnail copies of
the images for display in the user search results.' 3 Second, when a
user actually clicks on the thumbnail search result image, Google
directs the user to the website where the image was originally
located.'04
Adopting what the district court referred to as the "server test,"
the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the statutory definition of
public display requires the showing of a copy of the work, Perfect
10 had at least made a prima facie case of public display
infringement on this point because Google had thumbnail copies of
the images stored on its servers in the first stage and had
communicated those images to users5 With similar reasoning,
the court also concluded that the second part of the system-
linking users to full-sized copies of the work held on a third-party
website-did not constitute direct infringement of the display right
because Google was not communicating a copy of the image that
Google hosted, but rather, HTML code which directed users to the
original site.o' Addressing the objection that this approach
0l' 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
102 Id. at 1151.
"3 Id. at 1155-57.
104 id
"o Id. at 1160. The court ultimately held that the creation and use of these
thumbnails was likely to be fair use. Id at 1168.
1o6 Id. at 1161.
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collapses the public display right into the reproduction right,'" the
court offered that the section 106 rights not only overlap, but also
in some circumstances, must be asserted together to make an
infringement claim.'"8 On the facts before it, however, the court
could only so conclude by implicitly deciding that the copies made
were also displayed "publicly," an issue not discussed in the
opinion.
Finally, an important discussion of the union of these rights
was presented in The New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini.'0 9 In
Tasini, freelance authors who contributed articles to print
periodicals sued when the publishers of those periodicals made the
articles available electronically to subscribers of the NEXIS
database."o The publishers claimed privilege to use the works in
their new database based on section 201(c), which provides that, in
the absence of an express agreement, the copyright owner of a
collective work (e.g., a newspaper) has certain privileges to
reproduce and distribute copies of individual contributions (e.g.,
news articles) as part of the collective work or any subsequent
revisions of the collective work."'
107 Id. ("Nor does our ruling that a computer owner does not display a copy of
an image when it communicates only the HTML address of the copy
erroneously collapse the display right in section 106(5) into the reproduction
right set forth in section 106(1). Nothing in the Copyright Act prevents the
various rights protected in section 106 from overlapping. Indeed, under some
circumstances, more than one right must be infringed in order for an
infringement claim to arise.").
08 Id
109 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
n0 1d. at 487-88.
.. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006) ("Copyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and
vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express
transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing
and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any
revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same
series.").
172 [VOL. 14: 145
Public Display
The publishers asserted that they were merely asserting their
privilege to make a revision of the work in a digital format.112 The
authors countered with two points: (1) Taking the articles out of
their original context and allowing users to access each article
individually was not a revision within the meaning of the Act,"'
and (2) the privilege extends only to reproduction and distribution;
making the articles accessible to viewers through the database also
implicated the public display right."4
The district court agreed with the publishers." For the
authors' second proposition-that the privilege only extended to
reproduction and distribution, but not public display-the court
explained that by focusing so closely on the public display right,
the authors failed to understand the nuanced relationship between
it and the right of reproduction."' Reviewing the legislative
history, the court explained that it revealed a "design to extend
display rights, in 'certain limited circumstances,' to the creators of
collective works";' where reproduction and distribution were
otherwise permitted, any incidental public display of the work
would be permissible."' Ultimately, the district court was
reversed, but on the grounds that using the articles in digital format
was not within the section 201(c) privilege."'
112 Reply Brief For Petitioners at 2, Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
" Respondents' Brief at 15-25, Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
l4Id at 25-26.
" Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd
sub nom. Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., Inc., 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533
U.S. 483 (2001).
6 Id. at 816.
''
7 Id. at 817.
118 Id.
19 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the electronic copies
simply did not fall within the scope of the section 201(c) privilege; it never
mentioned the public display issue in its opinion. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co.,
Inc., 206 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, but ultimately agreed with the Second Circuit. Tasini,
533 U.S. at 488. The Court specifically declined to answer the public display
question. Id. at Appendix I (letter from Marybeth Peters, the Register of
Copyrights at the U.S. Office of Copyrights, establishing her position on the
U.S. Supreme Court Case, N.Y Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini); id. at 498 n.8.
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Although Tasini is primarily concerned with a section of the
Act that has limited applicability outside of the collective works
that are the subject of section 201(c), it raises important questions
that relate to all of the cases discussed above about how public
display operates together with reproduction. The reasoning of the
district court in Tasini relied on the idea that "reproduction" results
in "copies," which are defined to be "material objects . . . in which
a work is fixed ... and from which the work can be perceived."'2 0
Thus, the court concluded that "the right to reproduce a work,
which necessarily encompasses the right to create copies of that
work, presupposed that such copies might be 'perceived' " and so
displayed.121 Subsequent decisions have not squarely addressed the
issue, and it remains an open question.122
How this reasoning might apply in other situations is difficult
to determine. For example, if one is granted a right to reproduce
and distribute via a license (rather than a statutory grant, as was the
case in Tasini), does that also include the attendant right to display
publicly? The logic of the district court would seem to answer that
question in the affirmative. To do so, however, would seem to
read the "public" part of public display out of the statute. A related
question is, if the reproduction or distribution falls within a
particular exception in the Act, does that also carry the public
display right along with it? 23 For example, section 108(e) of the
(recognizing that it was "an issue the Register of Copyrights has argued
vigorously").
120 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
121 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 816.
122 But see Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc., 533 F.3d 1244, 1277-81
(11th Cir. 2011) (Birch, J., dissenting) (adopting, almost in totality, the
Copyright Office's position on Tasini).
123 The application of specific exceptions beyond the rights identified in each
is doubtful, if for no other reasons than such broadening of the exceptions is
contrary to the basic structure of the Act. As David Ladd, the former Register of
Copyrights, noted:
The statute sets forth these rights in broad terms, unlimited by general
requirements of commerciality or profit, and then provides express and
specific limitations . . . to these rights in the [16] sections that follow. The
very architecture of the statute thus has compelling advantages in explicitly
demarcating the legislature's balance between the rights of ownership and
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Act permits libraries and archives to reproduce and distribute an
entire work at a users' request if that work is not available at a fair
price.124  Section 108(e) requires that the copy produced become
the property of the user and that the library prominently display a
copyright warning where orders are taken and on the order forms
for the copies.125  If those requirements are met, and thus the
reproduction and distribution fall within the section 108(e)
exception, does the library also have the right to display the work
to the user publicly?'2 6
the rights of use. By the same token, the statute avoids wholesale
exceptions, such as "not-for-profit" uses, which entail too great a risk of
eroding the copyright monopoly. Specific claims for additional limitations,
qualifications, or exemptions thereby must be subjected to the legislative
process and assessed on the whole evidence from all interests, instead of a
limited litigation record among a few private parties.
David Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction ofProtected Works, 68 A.B.A.
J. 42, 43 (1982). Thus, most exceptions within the Act are worded with
particular applications or particular types of users in mind. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(b). Fair use, a generally applicable exception to all the exclusive rights,
may be able to capture uses that do not precisely fall within specific exceptions
but that are in line with the purpose of those sections. But even fair use has
limits in terms of the uses it can cover. Furthermore, public display itself is the
subject of multiple exceptions. For example, exceptions exist for specific
nonprofit uses in section 110; for displays of the work "where the copy is
located" in section 109(c); and for certain limited displays of useful articles for
advertising or commentary in section 113(c).
If exceptions to public display were meant to also accompany the exceptions
to other rights, then surely the statute would say so. Changes have been
suggested to those exceptions to meet the needs of the digital world through
either legislative modification or through more considerate judicial
interpretation. Efforts to match those exceptions with the digital world are
important, and should include consideration of the public display right.
124 17 U.S.C. § 108(e).
125 id
126 See PRUE ADLER, JONATHAN BAND & BRANDON BUTLER, RESOURCE
PACKET ON ORPHAN WoRKs: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR RESEARCH
LIBRARIES 16 (2011), available at http://www.art.org/bm-doc/resource orphan
works 13septll.pdf (replying to the argument that section 108(e) does not
authorize public displays by relying on the idea that users obtain copies of the
works that then reside on their home machines, which are copies but not
displays). This position is supported in part by U.S. v. Am. Soc 'y of Composers,
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If the public display right described above seems muddled, it
is. In litigation, public display is relied upon primarily in
connection with other rights, and consequently there is very little
interpretation or understanding of how it fits by itself into the
overall statutory scheme of protection. Two things, however, are
evident. First, public display was created with a desire to preserve
markets for works that developed under the reproduction and
distribution rights; the legislative history reveals that legislators
were troubled that mere shift in media (contrasted with changes in
the form of the work as with public performance), would displace
the market for copies of the original. Secondly, the public display
right is intertwined with the other exclusive rights in a way that
makes it dependent on, and in some ways subservient to, their
interpretation. It is also clear that public display might be
important in the online environment, but it is unclear exactly how.
IV. DEFINING "PUBLIC" DISPLAY FOR DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
This Article asserts that public display can be self-limiting in a
way that approximates the behavior that reproduction and
distribution and their attendant exceptions have exhibited for
physical copies of works. Such an approximation would allow for
greater access to copyrighted works online, while preserving the
markets for individual copies of the work that have been important
economic incentives for creators. Display by itself is sweeping in
application: "[T]o show a copy" is essentially all that is
required.'2 7  The right is limited, however, by the term
"publicly,"'2 8 and it is upon that limitation that this Article focuses.
Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010), which addresses the issue in
the context of public performance. Id. at 73 ("Because the electronic download
itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the musical work encoded
in the digital transmission, we hold that such a download is not a performance of
that work, as defined by § 101.").
127 See supra, Part II.
128 The idea that public display is self-limited by the term "public" is no
revelation. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 7.11 ("Section 106(5) balances the
interests of copyright owners in profiting from displays of their works against
the interest of copyright users in displaying works freely in circumstances that
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This Article proposes an interpretation to focus its application on
the problems that Congress sought to address, while avoiding an
overly broad application that would stifle the types of uses
currently found permissible in the physical context.129
More specifically, this Article suggests that "the public" can be
reasonably understood to mean the public market for the work.
Thus, for purposes of public display, "the public" can be defined as
"a number of people that would affect the market for individual
copies." This focus fits with the general concept of rivalry that
supports the markets for reproduction and distribution. Book
rightsholders thrive on the reproduction right because only one
person can effectively use a copy of the book at a time; more
copies must be obtained if others want to simultaneously read it.
Similarly, a display right that is bound by that same concept of
rivalry would backstop the market for copies that it was meant to
support. It would also provide a built-in mechanism by which
courts can map the display right to the more fundamental,
utilitarian principles of copyright.'
To understand what this proposed definition means, it is useful
to first examine current judicial definitions of the term "the public"
to see whether such a definition is reasonable given the current
state of the case law. This Article concludes that it is. After such
an examination, this Part concludes by demonstrating how this
definition would operate within the text of the Act to enable
activities like online viewing of digital collections by individual
users.
do not justify the expense of license negotiations with the copyright owner; the
right's limitation to 'public' displays is an example of this balance.").
129 In some ways, this approach presents the opposite side of the existing
debate over personal use and the range of motion that individuals users are (or
should be) permitted under copyright law. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful
Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
130 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright
Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 33-
38 (2010) (discussing proposals to building into the infringement analysis an
analysis of whether use of the work is commercial or has a commercial effect,
which would align with the underlying purpose of U.S. copyright law).
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A. Existing Definitions of "The Public"
Recall that public performance and display are bounded by a
two-clause definition of the term "publicly."l 3' Clause (1) covers
displays in specific locations-in places either open to the public,
or to places that are semi-public because the group of people
gathered in those places exceeds a normal circle of family or
friends.132 Clause (2) covers transmissions of displays to those
same locations, but also covers displays that are simply to the
public, whether members of the public are capable of receiving the
display at the same place or different places, and at the same time
or different times.'33
Both clauses (1) and (2) rely on the phrase "the public," but the
Act fails to define the term.'34 The omission was intentional, or at
least acknowledged, at the time of enactment. As one astute
observer noted at the 1964 hearing on the bill, "the word 'publicly'
is defined by referring back again to the word 'public.' You have
just transformed an adverb into a noun.... [T]here is no definition
131 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The statute states:
To perform or display 'publicly' means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.
Id.
132 id
133 id.
134 See Reese, supra note 15, at 15 (noting the absence of a definition); see
also Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d
121, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The statute itself does not expressly define the term
'performance' or the phrase 'to the public.' "). Note that beyond performance
and display, the distribution right also requires a distribution be to the public for
it to infringe. Cases examining the violation of that right may also be
instructive, though the public aspect of that right seems to be motivated by other
concerns related to actual publication of the work. See Hotaling v. Church of
Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1997); Ford Motor Co. v.
Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991).
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of what 'the public' is.""' Although this term is both undefined
and central to the meaning of the right, few courts have ventured to
define the term even in the context of public performance, and
none have stated what the term means in the context of public
display.
Instead, courts addressing the issue have tended to use the
clause (1) location-based approaches to defining whether the
display or performance was made publicly,"' with many courts
falling back on the semi-public language in clause (1) as a
justification for finding the facts before it constitute a public
display or performance."' Some courts have ventured to examine
135 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 5: 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 62 (Comm.
Print 1964) [hereinafter 1964 REVISION BILL DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS]. The
same observer went on to explain, under the text at the time, which was similar
to the enacted version, that, "[i]n clause (A) some of the curse is taken off this,
because you have a disjunctive phrase stating '. . . or at any place where a
substantial number of persons . . . [etc.].' But in [the transmission clause] we
are right back where we started from." Id. As described below, courts have
tended to seize upon this semi-public language as a guiding light.
136 This location-based approach is mimicked in the Act itself. Such a focus
makes sense when one considers that when most of the relevant language was
enacted, the place of viewing (e.g., a movie theater, or a person's home) largely
determined the size and importance of the market at issue. So, for example, the
term "the public" is approached by location in many definitional sections of
section 101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("An 'establishment' is a store, shop, or any
similar place of business open to the general public for the primary purpose of
selling goods . . . . A 'food service or drinking establishment' is a restaurant,
inn, bar, tavern, or any other similar place of business in which the public or
patrons assemble . . . . The term 'motion picture exhibition facility' means a
movie theater, screening room, or other venue that is being used primarily for
the exhibition of a copyrighted motion picture, if such exhibition is open to the
public.").
'37 For example, in Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prod., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237
(W.D.N.C. 1987), the court was asked to determine whether the display of an
unauthorized reproduction of child's toy at a manufacturers' associational trade
show constituted public display. Id. at 240-42. Even though the trade show
was open only to members of the manufacturing association, the court was quick
to note that, under the semi-public language in clause (1), the trade show
gathered together more than just the normal circle of family or friends. Id.
Thus, although the semi-public language in clause (1) was included as an
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
the more amorphous location-based concept of "open to the
public," but almost always do so in the context of the right of
public performance, not display. These cases are nonetheless
instructive because public performance and public display share a
common definition of publicly that at least arguably means that
same thing for both rights. In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Redd Horne, Inc.,"' for example, the Third Circuit was asked to
decide whether a video rental store infringed the copyright owners'
public performance right when it transmitted video cassette
recordings from the front of the store to a small number of patrons
inside private booths in the back of the store."' Relying on the
"place open to the public" language, the court concluded that the
public performance right was infringed because the store (and its
service) was open to any member of the public who paid the
appropriate fee.140 Emphasizing that a place can be open to the
public even if the place is not actually occupied by a crowd, 1' the
Third Circuit later held that videos viewed in a private room at a
rental store also violated the public performance right.'42  It
explained, "[a] telephone booth, a taxi cab, and even a pay toilet
are commonly regarded as 'open to the public,' even though they
are usually occupied only by one party at a time."'4 3 Other courts
additional exception to the general extension of the right to display in "places
open to the public," the Thomas court adopted it as its first stop in interpreting
the rule.
For distributed digital transmissions, focusing on the location of the display is
not always sensible, although some courts have followed this route. See, e.g.,
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding display online through BBS site to be public display either because it
was open to the public, or because it was a semi-public place).
' 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
3 1d. at 156-57.
140 Id. at 159. The court did cite to clause (2) of the definition to bolster the
proposition that a performance may still be public even if members of the public
are capable of viewing the performance see it at different times. Id.
141 Id. At least one other circuit has found similarly. See, e.g., Video Views,
Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1012-20 (7th Cir. 1991).
142 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir.
1986).
143 id
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answering similar questions, however, have held the opposite,
finding that performances inside private spaces such as a hotel
room or in a private bar were not open to the public.'"
Either way, location-based approaches are of limited use in the
context of digital networked communications because the place of
reception could be anywhere on the planet. Some transmitted
performances and displays can be to a place open to the public,
such as in the video stores, movie theaters, bars, and other such
places. But for many transmitted performances, the place of
reception could just as likely be on a laptop in an individual's
bedroom. The transmit clause of the definition of "publicly"
contemplates a location-neutral approach, and a few courts have
attempted to discern its meaning, particularly in the context of
public performance. 45
The court in On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries'46 tackled the issue head-on. On Command Video
designed a new video viewing system for hotels that consisted of a
computer program, a bank of video cassette players, and an
electronic switch that would allow the hotel to remotely transmit a
performance from a video cassette located in a centralized location
to a particular user's hotel room at the user's command.'4 7 Though
See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., v. Prof I Real Estate, Investors, Inc.,
866 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989) (addressing performance in a hotel); see also
Nat'l Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 729-33 (8th
Cir. 1986) (addressing performance in a bar).
145 The court in Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer &
Frailey, 497 F. Supp.2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007), cited to cases that rely on
interpretations of this language, and it did so for the purpose of determining
whether images shown on a computer screen constituted public display. Id. at
635. The Healthcare Advocates court, however, at the same time cited to the
semi-public language in clause (1) in support of its conclusion that, "the display
of copyrighted images on computers in an office constitutes a public display."
Id. Although the transmit clause language in clause (2) would seem to more
naturally apply, it is unclear whether the court meant to base its ruling upon that
language. In either case, the court offered very little additional analysis to
support its conclusion and thus it is difficult to say with certainty what that
decision means under either clause (1) or clause (2). See id.
146 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 788.
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the court concluded that performances received inside the hotel
rooms were not in a place open to the public as required under
clause (1), the performances were nonetheless "to the public"
under the transmit language in clause (2). 148 The court explained
that the transmission was to the public because "the relationship
between the transmitter of the performance, On Command, and the
audience, hotel guests, is a commercial, 'public' one regardless of
where the viewing takes place."'49
Under analogous facts, the district court in Warner Brothers
Entertainment Inc., v. WTV Systems, Inc.5 o recently came to a
similar conclusion. In that case, WTV Systems operated a "DVD
rental" service for online access to streams of DVDs through a
website called Zediva."' When a user requested to view a
particular DVD, a lawfully purchased copy of the DVD (preloaded
into one of the hundreds of DVD players owned and hosted on-site
by WTV) would be called up and transmitted over the Internet to
the user's computer.'52 The Zediva court held that such a system
violated the copyright owners' public performance right under the
transmit language of clause (2).1'5 Citing to On Command, the
court held that the performance was public because "the
relationship between Defendants, as the transmitter of the
performance, and the audience, which in this case consists of their
customers, is a commercial, 'public' relationship regardless of
where the viewing takes place."'54
148 Id. at 789-90.
149 Id at 790.
o 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
' ' Id. at 1005.
152 id
153 Id. at 1008.
154 Id. The court also cited to the Redd Horne case cited above to support the
proposition that Zediva's operations infringed the public performance right
because "[c]ustomers watching [copyrighted works] on their computer through
Zediva's system are not necessarily watching it in a 'public place,' but those
customers are nonetheless members of 'the public.' " Id. at 1009 (citing
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.
1984)). But the court in Redd Horne based its decision primarily on the place of
reception (a video store that was open to the public), and not on the precise
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Both the On Command and Zediva courts took an approach to
defining "the public" that emphasized the commercial relationship
between the parties as the determinative factor. Even considering
that these cases are about public performance, not display (which
should, perhaps, be viewed differently),' both could have the
same result under the definition proposed by this Article. This
Article argues, however, that because copyright law is primarily an
economic tool, it makes more sense to examine the market effect
directly rather than looking to the nature of the relationship
between the parties. The reception by a number of people who
would impact the market for the work"' would yield a similar
result as examining whether a relationship was commercial, but
with the added advantage that it would also assess market impact
for non-commercial displays that also impact the market.'"
The court in Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.
(Cablevision)' also addressed clause (2) and transmissions to the
public.' Recall that in that case, CSC Holdings (Cablevision)
nature of "the public" itself. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc.,
749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984). The district court explicitly took this focus.
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494,
500 (W.D. Pa. 1983), affd sub nom. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Our finding is based on the view that
the viewing rooms at Maxwell's more closely resemble mini-movie theaters
than living rooms away from home."). On appeal, the Third Circuit flatly
declined to conduct a further analysis of even the semi-public clause, stating that
"we agree with the district court's conclusion that Maxwell's was open to the
public." Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. While the district court did state that
clause (2) "bolstered" the point, it did not base its holding upon it; on review,
the Third circuit took a similar approach. Id.
15s See infra notes 195-197 and accompanying text.
56 Note that because public performance does not require a copy of the work
to infringe the right (unlike public display, which does require a copy), it makes
little sense to approach "the public" in terms of its impact on the market for
copies; thus, this Article uses "effect on the market for the work" here instead.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 106(5) (2006); id. § 101 (2006).
157 Ignoring market impact by non-commercial performances was cited by the
court as one of the reasons it rejected the approach in Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008).
158 Id.
15 9 Id. at 139.
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provided a service where copies of TV performances were made
and stored on its RS-DVR service at a user's request, and could
then be transmitted to the user via a television in his or her home.160
After deciding that the copies transmitted to the users were of
insufficient duration to constitute a copy or reproduction for
purposes of the Copyright Act,16 ' the court also had to address
whether the transmission of those performances violated the
plaintiffs public performance right.'6 2 The court ultimately held
that the public performance right was not infringed, but only by
following a rather convoluted path through the statutory text.163
Starting with the proposition that the person capable of
receiving a given performance at issue was of significance, and
combining with that the idea that "a transmission of a performance
is itself a performance," the court ultimately focused its analysis on
the group of people capable of receiving the transmission to
determine whether the transmission was to the public." Because
the system that Cablevision employed would only transmit a
unique copy of the work to the user who directed that the copy be
made, the court concluded that the potential audience for the
transmission was so limited as to fall outside of a public
performance.'W Although the Cablevision court contends that it
interprets the phrase "to the public," its review and application of
the transmission language avoids the "to the public" phrase by
focusing instead on the particular transmissions of a unique copy
of a work and the group of people capable of receiving that
transmission.' On the facts before it, where only the individual
who directed the creation of the copy could receive the recording,
1o Id at 123-25.
161 Id at 127-30.
162 Id. at 134.
163 See id. at 139; see also Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REv. 505 (2010)
(explaining the logic behind the court's decision in this issue).
1 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 136-38.
165 Id at 137 (finding consideration of the uniqueness of the copy important
because, "in general, any factor that limits the potential audience of a
transmission is relevant").
166Id. at 138-39.
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the court concluded that the transmission was not to the public.167
While this approach adds an extra (and rather complicated) layer to
the analysis, it ultimately does not answer the underlying question
about the nature of "the public" in this context.
This same basic approach was adopted by the district court in
American Broadcasting Companies., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc."'s That
case centered around Aereo's digital streaming system, which
allows users to view (or record) live transmissions of New York
City area television broadcasts.'6 9 Like Cablevision, Aereo
operated by providing users with unique access to their own
personal copy of the work, as well as their individualized antenna
to receive the initial broadcast transmission.' Based on these
basic similarities the court denied ABC's preliminary injunction
motion, finding that the Aereo system was "materially identical" to
the Cablevision system, at least for purpose of the public display
right."' Also like Cablevision, the Aereo court skirted the need to
define "the public" by focusing on the particular copy and
transmission.72
The Aereo court, however, recognized a second important
similarity that bears more directly on understanding the nature of
the public display right before it-the court pointed out that the
importance in Cablevision of the "undercurrent to the Second
Circuit's reasoning suggesting that the Cablevision system merely
allowed subscribers to enjoy a service that could also be
accomplished using any standard DVR or VCR.""' The Aereo
court went on to explain that this purposeful approach meant that
"[t]o the extent that the Second Circuit's holding in Cablevision
was premised on an inability to distinguish Cablevision's system
'
6 Id. at 139.
8 Nos. 12 Civ. 1540 (AJN), 12 Civ. 1543, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96309
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012).
169 Id. at *2.
70 Id at *2-4.
' Id. at * 11.
Id at *21.
' Id. at *20.
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from otherwise lawful activities, Aereo's system deserves the same
consideration."l 74
Finally, it is worth noting that the above interpretations are all
focused on public performance, and not display. As explained
above, there are basic differences between public performance and
public display, in terms of the issues Congress sought to address
and the way in which each right is defined in the text of the Act.'7 1
First, recall that while public display requires a showing of a copy
of the work, public performance does not.176 Thus, an emphasis on
the nature of and market for copies-rather than the market for
work or the commerciality of the context-may be an appropriate
consideration when looking at the public display of a copy of the
work.
Second, the types of materials that are publicly displayed are
often characteristically different from performances. Although the
two share a common definition of publicly, as Professor Goldstein
explains:
[The] two rights may require that the statutory definition be applied
differently to each. Because performances are characteristically
animated or audible, they naturally tend to attract a crowd whenever
they are given in a public place. A manuscript or drawing displayed in
the same public place may not attract nearly the same number of people
nor affect the market for the copyrighted work so substantially. As a
consequence, courts determining whether a work has been publicly
displayed under the terms of section 106(5) will consider whether, as
situated in the public space, the work was likely to attract members of
the public to view it.' 77
174 Id. at *37.
1s See supra Part II.A.
176 This is so despite the Cablevision court's statement that "no transmission
of an audiovisual work can be made, we assume, without using a copy of that
work." Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536
F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). While true, a transmission of an infringing
performance in general can easily be made without a copy of the work.
177 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 27, § 7.10 (comparing Streeter v.
Rolfe, 491 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980) with Burwood Prods. Co. v. Marsel
Mirror & Glass Prod., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1979)). But see PATRY,
supra note 72, § 15.3 (criticizing Professor Goldstein's approach because the
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While Professor Goldstein discusses the distinction in relation to
the location of a performance or display, which is governed by the
clause (1) open to the public or semipublic language, the same
intuition would seem to hold for transmissions. Performances have
developed markets based on the act of performance itself. Thus,
transmissions that impact those performance markets should be
treated differently than transmissions of potentially-public
displays, the exclusive right of which is designed to protect
markets from adverse impacts that are created with a shift in
medium from physical copies to displays on a screen. Because of
these differences, even where the definition of "the public" in the
context of public performance is perhaps in conflict with the
definition proposed by this paper, the conflict may not be fatal as
the two rights need not follow precisely the same path to achieving
their intended purposes.
B. Situating the Definition Within the Text of the Act
Fitting the proposed definition into the statutory text illustrates
how it both supports the outcomes of prior case law and complies
with the legislative motivation for creation. For clause (1) of the
definition, using the proposed language of "a number of people
who would affect the market for individual copies" would have
little or no impact. Clause (1) is concerned with direct displays
and directs its focus on particular locations-either places that are
semi-public, or places that are open to the public.' The definition
would have no impact on the semipublic places clause, because
that section does not rely on a definition of "the public."' For
places that were deemed open to the public under an even less
precise approach, such as was the case of the private video viewing
rooms in Redd Horne,"so would remain open to the public under
this definition because those places are open to a significant
statutory language and, he concludes, the legislative history, make no such
distinction).
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
179 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
"s Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 156-57
(3d Cir. 1984).
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number of people (indeed, any paying customer), the number of
which would undoubtedly impact the market for individual copies.
Whether that number of people actually view the work is
irrelevant, because the place is open and accessible to that group of
people.
Application to the transmission clause in clause (2) of the
definition of public display is more complicated. The first part of
clause (2) simply covers transmissions of a display to a place
covered by clause (1).8"' With the proposed approach of this
Article, the meaning of the location of the display-either a
semipublic place or a place open to the public-is the same as that
noted above and would have a result identical to that explained in
the previous paragraph.
The second part of clause (2) covers transmissions of a display
that are simply transmitted to the public, whether the members of
the public capable of receiving the display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times. 18 2 Transposing in the proposed definition of "the public"
yields a statement about transmitted public display that is both
intuitive and that captures many of the concerns expressed in the
legislative history and in the existing case law:
To . . . display a work 'publicly' means ... to transmit or otherwise
communicate a ... display of the work ... to [a number of people that
would affect the market for individual copies of the work], . . . whether
the members of [that group] capable of receiving the ... display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times. 183
To understand how this would work in practice, it is useful to work
through some examples. Imagine a university library that holds a
digitized copy of a book that resides in its physical collection. The
physical copy is impounded while the digital copy is made
available to users. Any university affiliated faculty, staff, or
students can log on to the library's website to view the book, and
they are warned that access is for personal viewing only. Assume
181 17 U.S.C. § 101.
182 id.
13id.
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that one student logs on to view the book on her laptop. Under the
above interpretation, the display would not be public because one
student accessing the work would not be a number that would
affect the market for individual copies. Absent the online display,
the student could have easily checked out the physical book from
the library; the market for the copies would remain unchanged. If
a second, third, or fourth person were to view the display,
however, this would certainly impact the analysis because,
ordinarily, only one person may use the physical copy at any given
time.
Clause (2) provides that a display can be to the public even if
members of the public receive the transmission of the display in
the same place or a different place, and at the same time or at a
different time.'84 Digital transmissions are in fact valuable because
they permit viewers to do these things-to look at a copy of a work
in the comfort of their own homes (different places) and whenever
they wish (different times).
When more than one person views a display across space, and
particularly across time, the market-based definition proposed here
is particularly useful. Suppose a transmission of a display is made
to one student in January 2012. As is often the case with works in
academic collections, the work is then viewed again two years later
by another student in January 2014. Although in this case one
copy of the work is viewed by more than one viewer, the market
effect would be negligible or nonexistent, and so the display would
not be public for purposes of the Act. If, however, the views were
simultaneous, or involved many views in immediate succession,
the market might be impacted.
Thus, for the temporal aspect, displays and the transmissions
that enable them would be viewed on a sliding scale; if more than
one person viewed a copy of the work simultaneously, of course,
then the market would be negatively affected because two readers
cannot ordinarily use one copy at the same time. That display
would then be public. But, the further apart in time the viewers
are, the lower the impact on market for copies because users can
184id
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ordinarily share a copy spread over such a time (as libraries have
always done with physical books).' Additionally, aggregating the
displays for purposes of establishing an effect on the market would
require discounting the value of future views to their present value
(because viewing the work now is more valuable than viewing the
work six months from now); at a certain point far in the future, the
value of those views becomes insignificant.'86
This built-in temporal sliding scale also addresses many of the
concerns with which the Cablevision court attempted to grapple.
Recall that that court, in parsing the language surrounding "to the
public," focused heavily on the particular transmission, the group
of people capable of receiving it, and the particular copy
transmitted."' The court took a transactional view of transmission,
essentially requiring that each transmission use a unique copy of
the work to avoid making the transmission one to "the public."'
That transactional requirement is needed because without it
complicated questions about the duration of a particular
transmission would arise (e.g., if a transmission is displayed to one
185 The market impact may not be limited only to simultaneous views.
Libraries in the physical world have, necessarily, worked in a certain amount of
friction that separates uses. If a user checks out a book on Friday and returns it
on Monday, it ordinarily will take one or two extra days for the library to
process and reshelve that book. Thus, the next user would only have access to it
days after it has been returned. This type of built in friction, perhaps on a case-
by-case basis, might be considered when examining market impact. It could, for
example, help preserve the markets that exist for bestsellers that are checked out
in rapid succession from public libraries, as public libraries often need to buy
several copies of those works to match demand plus the intervening friction. For
other less popular works, a more moderate pace might allow only one copy to
serve as the display copy over a long period of time. Of course, as markets
evolve and come to exist primarily in the on-demand digital context, these
considerations would fade.
18 For example, if a patron had to purchase a copy of a $50 book forty years
in the future, the present value of that book would only be $6.00, assuming
continuously compounded interest at a rate of 5%. Aggregating many such
displays would affect the market for copies, but one or a few future views
would, in at least some cases, have virtually no impact today.
187 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d
121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
188 See id.
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user now, and another ten years from now, is that the same
display?), and whether views over the long-term should be
aggregated to determine whether it was to the public.'" But the
intense reading that the Second Circuit conducts becomes
unnecessary if the public is thought of as the public market for the
work, which already factors in the temporal component.
To point out the simplicity of the approach, consider that under
the facts of Cablevision, the result is the same when using the
proposed definition of "the public." As the Aereo court observed
when interpreting Cablevision, there is an "undercurrent to the
Second Circuit's reasoning suggesting that the Cablevision system
merely allowed subscribers to enjoy a service that could also be
accomplished using any standard DVR or VCR," i.e., "otherwise
lawful activities."l90 The undercurrent implicitly recognizes what
the proposed definition makes explicit-that displays (or
performances, in this case) which affect the public market for the
work are what matter; performances of only personal copies-
otherwise lawful-have no impact on the market because those
copies can already be made without seeking permission from (or
sending compensation to) the rightsholder. In the same way,
digital displays that equate to real-market activities that are
otherwise lawful (e.g., library lending of a book) have no market
affect and should therefore not be considered to "the public."
The approach of this Article, and the above applications, shows
that viewing the public aspect of public display as meaning the
public market for copies of the work is a workable option to enable
some limited online displays of works that might otherwise be
restricted. This approach does not solve the problems of allowing
users to download, manipulate, and make further uses of these
works, but it does allow for the online viewing of these works in a
way that would provide great benefit.
189 See Malkan, supra note 163, at 533-42 (noting similar hypothetical
problems with related approaches, as explained by Professor Nimmer).
190 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1540 (AJN), 12 Civ.
1543, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96309, at *36-37 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012).
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V. PUBLIC DISPLAY AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO DIGITAL
COLLECTIONS
Public display has special significance to digital collections,
but its scope is not well understood in that context. One reason for
this is that displays in the traditional context of libraries, archives,
and museums are in-person and are not contentious in terms of the
user's right to display. For example, when the Museum of Modem
Art displays Andy Warhol's "Gold Marilyn Monroe," it exhibits a
copy"' in a gallery open to the public (many people, in large
numbers, can come in and see it), of a pictorial or graphic work,'92
thus making it a public display. Although it is public, section
109(c) of the Act provides that the Museum, as owner of the
"particular copy"'9 3 of a work lawfully made under the Act, is
entitled without prior authorization to display the copy publicly to
viewers present at the place where the copy is located.'94 Similarly,
a library might be said to display a printed book when it lends it to
a patron, simply because the library shows a copy of it, but a
personal viewing of the work by a single patron is unlikely to be
considered public, and even if a display of the book were to be
made public, section 109(c) would seem to provide protection.
Because of limitations on the right in the context of direct
displays, the right of public display is of most interest in cases of
transmission.'9 5  Recall that to "transmit" requires that one
"communicate [a performance or display] by any device or process
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
192 See id. § 106(5) (listing the types of works covered by the public display
right).
193 Id. § 109(c). Note that one definitional quirk of the 1976 Act is that
originals are included in the term "copies." Id. § 101 ("The term 'copies'
includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first
fixed.").
194 Id. § 109(c).
195 Id. § 101 ("To perform or display a work 'publicly' means ... (2) to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times.").
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whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent."'9 6 Transmissions are the means by which
displays are made in the online environment. So far, however, the
rights of reproduction and display have existed in a largely
coterminous way-where display is apparent (though not
necessarily public display), so then is reproduction.
A. Reproduction and Display Online
Courts and plaintiffs have clung to the rights of reproduction
and distribution as the default tool for copyright protection, even in
the online realm where users often access only incidental copies in
the course of viewing the work. The RAM copy doctrine, which
emerged from the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc.,'" enabled this approach. The court in MAI
held that, because copies contained in a computers' temporary
random access memory (RAM) can be "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, . . . the loading of software into the
RAM creates a copy [and therefore a reproduction] under the
Copyright Act.""
The initial reaction to MAI and later courts' interpretation of
M4I was that the court was mistaken.'99 They argued that
incidental copies like those contained in RAM are not "fixed" as
copies for purposes of copyright protection because they did not
196 id.
' 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
198 Id. at 519. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999) (citing MAI, 991 F.2d
at 518, to support the proposition that "[w]hen a person browses a website, and
by so doing displays [the work], a copy of the [the work] is made in the
computer's [RAM], to permit viewing of the material. And in making a copy,
even a temporary one, the person who browsed infringes the copyright.").
199 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the
Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1258-77 (2001)
(reviewing some of the early criticism). But see, e.g., Joshua C. Liederman,
Note and Comment, Changing the Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 289, 292 (2010) (noting support for the
standard developed by courts following MAI).
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exist "for a period of more than transitory duration,"20 0 which is a
part of the statutory definition of "copies." Nevertheless, the broad
interpretation applied in MAI has many supporters, most important
among them several sister circuits,2 0' the Copyright Office,202 and at
least one Presidential administration.203
Recently, however, the strength of this doctrine has eroded in
certain respects. The Second Circuit in Cablevision20 4 explained
how MAI can be read narrowly to avoid finding that all temporary
instantiations of a work constituted a copy.205 That court addressed
the issue of whether temporary buffer copies of TV programming,
made through remote-storage DVR systems owned by Cablevision,
constituted copies for purposes of the Act.206 The court
emphasized that under the Act, copies must exist for more than a
transitory duration, and rejected the idea that the MAI court would
20 17 U.S.C. § 101; see generally Aaron Perzanowsi, Fixing Ram Copies, 104
Nw. U. L. REV. 1067 (2010) (providing a concise review of the RAM copy
doctrine).
201 See DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993)); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335-37
(9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Apple Inc. v Pystar, 658 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (9th
Cir. 2011); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th
Cir. 1995); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1120-21 (D. Nev. 1999); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177-78 (N.D. 111. 1997); Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995); see also
Jonathan Band & Jeny Marcinko, A New Perspective on Temporary Copies:
The Fourth Circuit's Opinion in CoStar v. Loopnet, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
1, 14 n.34 (2005) (listing decisions taking this view of Al4).
202 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 110-11 (2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-
1.pdf.
203 See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 27, 215-18
(1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
204 536 F. 3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
205 Id. at 128-30.
2 06 id.
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read this requirement out of the Act without even discussing it.207
Criticizing an approach that reads MAI more broadly,208 the court
concluded that on the facts before it-where "data resides in the
buffer for no longer than 1.2 seconds before being automatically
overwritten"-that no copy was made.209
Other decisions, notably, the Fourth Circuit decision in CoStar
Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,2 10 preceded the Cablevision court's
decision, and offer similar statements about the limited scope of
the RAM copy rule.2 11 While these decisions are so far the
exception rather than the rule, their potential effect is far-reaching
and could alter the nature of online communications.2 12 If use of
the reproduction right is no longer a foregone conclusion stemming
from every online display, the public display right takes on added
significance as potentially the only remaining tool for copyright
owners to protect their interests in that realm.
207 Id. at 128.
208 Id at 129 ("As we have stated, to determine whether a work is 'fixed' in a
given medium, the statutory language directs us to ask not only 1) whether a
work is 'embodied' in that medium, but also 2) whether it is embodied in the
medium 'for a period of more than transitory duration.' According to the
Copyright Office, if the work is capable of being copied from that medium for
any amount of time, the answer to both questions is 'yes.' The problem with this
interpretation is that it reads the 'transitory duration' language out of the
statute.").
209 Id. at 130 ("Given that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2
seconds before being automatically overwritten, and in the absence of
compelling arguments to the contrary, we believe that the copyrighted works
here are not 'embodied' in the buffers for a period of more than transitory
duration, and are therefore not 'fixed' in the buffers. Accordingly, the acts of
buffering in the operation of the RS-DVR do not create copies, as the Copyright
Act defines that term.").
210 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
211 Id. at 550-51.
212 See, e.g., Melissa A. Bogden, Comment, Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy
Doctrine, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 203-20 (2011) (discussing implications of the
apparent circuit split and the variety of ways to harmonize that split).
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B. Public Display and Online Libraries
Even with the reproduction right remaining as the primary
means of protecting rightsholders online, public display may still
be important in its own right for digital collections. Although
libraries, archives, and museums have lived in the online world as
long as it has existed, these institutions have only begun to foray
into the realm of digital transmissions by offering online displays
of their holdings.2 13 These forays are not mere experimentation,
however, and serious efforts are underway to create massive digital
libraries and archives in a way that will transform the way users
access library and archive holdings. The Digital Public Library of
America and Europeana are two recent and notable initiatives,2 14
but the motivation and groundwork for those projects has existed
for quite some time. Libraries and archives started cautiously with
digitization projects focusing on special collections of works
clearly in the public domain. Digitization projects funded or
affiliated with the Institute of Museum and Library Science
("IMLS")-many of which focus on public domain materials-
number nearly 1,000;215 these represent only a small subset of
similar efforts. Libraries have also experimented with digitizing
in-copyright and potentially in-copyright works.2 16 These efforts
were approached with much trepidation and institutions have
213 d
214 See DIGITAL PUBLIC LIBRARY OF AMERICA, http://dp.la/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2011); EUROPEANA, http://www.europeana.eu (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
215 There are, of course, many digitized projects focusing on published "core"
collection works that are clearly in the public domain. HathiTrust reports that
around 21 percent of its collection was published before 1923, amounting to
about 2 million volumes. See Wilkin, supra note 3. Many more works
published after 1923 are also in the public domain because of failure to comply
with formalities under the Copyright Act of 1909. Distinguishing those works
from works currently protected by copyright is a difficult and time consuming
process.
216 See Laura N. Gasaway, Libraries, Digital Content, and Copyright, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 755, 760 (2010) (reviewing some recent projects to
digitize in-copyrighted works and the difficulties encountered in obtaining rights
clearance).
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typically only proceeded to digitize works in ways that they hope
will minimize the risk of costly infringement suits. 2 17
Interest in digital access to cultural materials extends well
beyond those institutions that are typically thought of as a library
or archive.218 Projects like the Internet Archive aim to offer
"permanent access for researchers, historians, scholars, people with
disabilities, and the general public to historical collections that
exist in digital format."219 They, like many traditional libraries,220
also hope to preserve and maintain access for born digital materials
found on blogs, websites, listservs, and bulletin boards.2 21 For
these purposes, born digital increasingly includes materials
traditionally associated with physical media; many academic
journals, for example, are available in online-only formats,222 and
217 See LAURA CLARK BROWN, JUDY RUTTENBERG & KEVIN L. SMITH,
TRIANGLE RESEARCH LIBRARIES NETWORK, THE TRIANGLE RESEARCH
LIBRARIES NETWORK'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR
DIGITIZATION OF MODERN MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS AND ARCHIVAL RECORD
GROUPS 6 (2011), http://www.trln.org/IPRights.pdf (discussing a risk
management strategy for the digitization and online access of modern
manuscript collections).
218 The terms "library" or "archive" do have special legal significance for
purposes of certain exceptions to the exclusive rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108
(2006) (providing that "it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or
archives" to make certain copies for preservation or limited distribution
purposes). These terms, however, are neither defined in the act, nor have they
been defined by the courts. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483, 503 n.12 (2001) (declining to decide whether a so-called "electronic
library" maintained by publishers was included in the term "libraries" as used in
the Copyright Act).
219 About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org/ab
out.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
220 See Gasaway, supra note 216, at 766.
221 See, e.g., WEB ARCHIVING SERVICE, http://webarchives.cdlib.org/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2012).
222 This is almost always the case for open-access journals. See, e.g., PLOS
ONE Journal Information, PUBLIC LIBRARY OF SCIENCE, http://www.plosone.or
g/static/information.action (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). In the area of law
reviews, many journals are also online-only. See, e.g., Everything You Need to
Know About VJOLT, VA. J.L. & TECH., http://www.vjolt.net/about.php (last
visited Oct. 30, 2011). Due to costs of purchasing and storing copies, there are
serious efforts to persuade all law journals to cease publishing print copies
197FALL 2012]
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
audiovisual works are often produced and distributed solely across
the web.
Why have so many libraries gone to such great lengths to
digitize, collect, and maintain access to these materials online?
The answer is so intuitive it hardly needs citation: "If it's not on
the Web, it doesn't exist.""' It is also no revelation that users'
primary interests are no longer tied to physical access to copies of
copyrighted works. While in the past the printed book was often
the only embodiment of the creative work, users today access
content across a variety of devices and in a number of formats. It
is for this reason that most major libraries now spend more money
on providing their users with electronic access to these works than
they do on traditional print acquisitions.224 Despite this change in
access norms, reproduction and distribution still play an important
legal role in protecting rightsholders' interests, even if
interpretations as seen in Cablevision and CoStar do take firmer
hold.
Digitization projects like those undertaken by Google Books or
the HathiTrust will always implicate the reproduction right.
Because those projects convert analog materials into digital, the
conversion of those works necessarily requires the creation of a
fixed digital copy. While those reproductions may be acceptable if
they fall within one of the specific exceptions (in particular, fair
use or the library privileges under the Act),225 the reproduction
altogether. See Durham Statement on Open Access to Legal Scholarship,
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY (Feb. 11, 2009), http://cyber.law.h
arvard.edu/publications/durhamstatement.
223 Sarah Stevens-Rayburn & Ellen N. Bouton, "If It's Not on the Web, It
Doesn't Exist at All": Electronic Information Resources-Myth and Reality,
Vol. 153 LIBR. & INFO. SERVICES IN ASTRONOMY III, 1998, at 195.
224 See Ass'N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, ARL STATISTICS 2008-09, 20-21
(Martha Kyrillidou & Shaneka Morris, eds.) (2011), available at http://www.arl
.org/bm-doc/arlstat09.pdf.
225 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108 (2006) (addressing fair use and library
privileges). "Format shifting" under these exceptions is only permissible in
certain situations. See, e.g., id. § 108(c) (allowing libraries and archives to make
limited reproductions of works that are currently stored in obsolete formats);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444-56 (1984)
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right must still be overcome at the conversion from one medium to
another. Similarly, to the extent that those services allow users to
download and retain digital copies of the scanned works, the
reproduction and distribution rights may also be implicated.
But what of services that neither convert materials from print to
digital, nor allow users to retain locally stored copies of those
works? This situation is an increasingly plausible access solution
for libraries. Libraries can lawfully purchase or obtain digital
copies of works, and have the capability to exhibit those works
without the demand from users that the works be turned into copies
stored on the users' own machine. If the stored data were
transitory enough in duration, users' online access may not
necessarily implicate the reproduction or distribution rights.
Public display, however, may remain an obstacle.
Repositories of born-digital materials require no conversion
(and therefore, no additional reproductions), but may implicate the
public display right if viewed online.22 6 As libraries and archives
acquire these materials, they should remain cognizant of the rights
necessary to display those works in a meaningful way. Licensed
works raise similar concern. As Tasini and subsequent cases
illustrate, public display may not necessarily be joined to grants of
permission with respect to the reproduction right. If electronic
license packages negotiated by libraries include only rights of
(holding that in home "time-shifting" of television shows onto tape for later
viewing could be a lawful personal use).
226 One potential reproduction-right concern with all of these materials is the
automated creation of backup copies. The systematized practice of "digital
preservation" only emerged within the last twenty years and there is little law on
how issues like the automatic creation of backup copies or drive imaging work
with respect to copyright law. See Peter B. Hirtle, The History and Current
State of Digital Preservation in the United States, in METADATA AND DIGITAL
COLLECTIONS: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF TOM TURNER 138 (Elaine
Westbrooks & Keith Jenkins, eds., 2009), http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS/Reposito
ry/1.O/Disseminate?view-body&id=pdf 1&handle=cul.pub/1238609304 (citing
JUNE BESEK, COPYRIGHT ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE CREATION OF A DIGITAL
ARCHIVE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT (Council on Library and Information
Resources and the Library of Congress, 2003), available at
http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/publ12/contents.html).
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reproduction and distribution, but not display, it is unclear what
can be done with those works when presented openly to many
users.
In the absence of the reproduction and distribution rights, either
because they do not apply or because they are licensed or
purchased, copyright restrictions on online access to digital copies
of textual or visual materials must, if they exist at all, rest on the
right of public display. As this Article attempts to make clear,
public display is not a particularly distinct or well-defined right.
The general thrust of the problem that Congress was trying to
address is clear-that public exhibitions of works should not
cannibalize the markets established by reproduction and
distribution, but the exact way that the public display right
achieves this goal is not well answered in the text of the statute,
legislative history, or the case law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public display is but one of the rights that stand before digital
libraries that seek to enable greater access to their holdings. The
rights of reproduction and distribution and the exceptions that
accompany those rights have allowed physical libraries to operate
within the copyright system of limited monopoly balanced with
public access. The Copyright Act is shrewd in this regard; its basic
aim is to permit this monopoly and therefor foster a market upon
which owners can capitalize. Online, the rights of reproduction
and distribution have swollen beyond the market protection
originally envisioned.227 Should the expanse of those rights recede
(as it appears they might), rightsholders must turn to other of the
227 Jonah M. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright's
Vanishing Performance/Distribution Distinction, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
531, 533 (2007) ("But the crisis in copyright law occasioned by the Internet
extends beyond the infamously widespread availability of unauthorized,
infringing content and the attendant controversy over the liability of file-sharing
services. It goes deeper, to the very question of whether traditional categories
and distinctions in copyright law-such as the once obvious distinction among
'performances,' 'reproductions,' and 'distributions'-remain meaningful and
applicable in the Internet context at all.").
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exclusive rights to protect their interests. Public display is a likely
candidate. Even without such a reduction in force, a precise
understanding of the exclusive rights is important to determine the
reasons why access is inhibited and the ways that it can be
remedied.
Public display is another one of the six exclusive rights that
may hinder access to digital collections. Because public display is
so seldom seen in the disputes and resulting case law that guide
current practice, it is unclear what role public display has. It may,
for example, reach just as broadly-or perhaps even further-as
reproduction and distribution currently do in the online context.
This Article presents a way to avoid that. By focusing the
definition of the right on the protection of markets for which the
public display right was created, this Article attempts to carve a
tenable path between absolute monopoly on the one hand, and
absolute public access on the other. The definition suggested here
preserves the limited monopoly rights of owners in a way that
maintains the rivatrous good fiction that is seen in other parts of
the Act. At the same time, it leverages the value-maximizing role
that libraries have traditional played by allowing one copy to be
displayed to many users, but in a way that avoids impact on the
traditional markets associated with that work.
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